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Agency and the Ontology of the
Corporation
Christopher M. Bruner *
The degree to which corporate entities ought to be treated
like natural entities—i.e., real people—has confounded legal
theorists since the emergence of the corporate form. As Sir
Edward Coke memorably put it in his 1614 report on The Case of
Sutton’s Hospital, “a corporation aggregate of many is invisible,
immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the
law.” 1 Put differently, the corporation is a legal fiction—and an
elusive one at that, synonymous with, yet distinct from, its
various constituents. Though “but one person in law,” as Sir
William Blackstone would explain in 1765, it is “a person that
never dies: in like manner as the river Thames is still the same
river, though the parts which compose it are changing every
instant.” 2
Modern business corporations remain as ontologically
complex as they are commercially ubiquitous. 3 To be sure, we
routinely take for granted that corporations can themselves
undertake many of the commercial activities that people do.
Corporations can sue and be sued; buy, hold, and sell property;
enter contracts; borrow and lend money, and so on. 4 They can
also hire agents to act on their behalf 5—a critical capacity
because, as Coke and Blackstone well understood centuries ago, a
fictional entity cannot act on its own. Indeed, numerous aspects
*
1.

Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
EDWARD COKE, 5 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. IN THIRTEEN
PARTS pt. X, at *32b (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1826).
2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *456 (Cavendish Publishing
2001) (1765).
3. For further discussion see Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1387–95 (2008).
4. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122(2), (4), (13)–(14) (2011).
5. Id. § 122(5).

355

356

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 355 (2012)

of corporate life continue to defy straightforward analogy to our
own lives. Particularly vexing problems have arisen where
corporate law intersects with other complex areas of law and
policy. Prominent and controversial examples in recent years
have included corporate political speech, 6 corporate criminal
liability, 7 and as Christine Shepard’s superb Note explores, the
corporate entity’s posture vis-à-vis fraud committed by certain of
its agents, yet undetected by others—specifically, officers cooking
the books and auditors negligently failing to uncover it. 8 In this
unhappy circumstance, should we treat the corporate entity
itself—and, therefore, innocent constituencies including public
shareholders who want to sue on its behalf—as a wrongdoer by
association with the officers, or as a victim of auditor negligence?
Determining how we ought to conceptualize the corporation,
as such, in cases of corporate fraud raises some exceptionally
thorny doctrinal problems. Whose acts count as “corporate” acts,
and when? How do the policy aims of agency law relate to those of
corporate law and other relevant fields? How do we optimally
calibrate the incentives of those who, in one way or another, act
on the corporation’s behalf—including officers, directors, and
outside professionals such as auditors?
Shepard’s Note presents a clear, thorough, and persuasive
critique of a muddled case law. 9 She argues compellingly that
courts have widely erred, both in law and in policy, in permitting
auditors to defend malpractice actions by too readily
characterizing the corporation itself as a wrongdoer—the socalled “in pari delicto” defense. This defense denies a remedy to a
plaintiff deemed equally at fault, an outcome courts have reached
by imputing the officer-fraudster’s knowledge to the corporation
6. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886
(2010) (holding that the government may not suppress corporate political
speech).
7. E.g., Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1507 (2009) (exploring “the past, present, and future of corporate
criminal law”).
8. Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto
Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
275 (2011). As Shepard clarifies, an auditor’s duty is not to expose fraud, but to
perform in accordance with established professional standards. Id. at 277 n.1.
9. See id. pt. II.C.
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under agency law. 10 In this comment I briefly review Shepard’s
analysis, highlighting the important contribution made to the
relevant legal and policy debates, and discuss further avenues
that might be explored in operationalizing the novel and sensible
solution that she proposes.
Shepard’s discussion of the current state of the law 11
emphasizes that the in pari delicto defense, on the one hand, and
imputation under agency law, on the other, arose in different
settings to further different policy aims. Effectively, in pari
delicto is to law what the doctrine of unclean hands is to equity,
favoring the defendant in a case of equal fault. Being historically
rooted in equity, there is an inevitable imprecision about the in
pari delicto defense, reflected most obviously in the “public policy”
safety valve giving courts the ability to deny the defense where
permitting it would contradict its purpose. As Shepard notes, this
should preclude the defense where required to “prevent a
wrongdoer from profiting from his own misconduct.” 12 The agency
doctrine of imputation, on the other hand, deems principals to
know facts known to their agents in order to allocate most
efficiently the risks associated with agent misconduct—the idea
being that principals are typically better positioned to police their
own agents than are third parties in the marketplace with whom
those agents transact on their principals’ behalf. 13 To be sure,
imputation itself is subject to exceptions, most notably the
“adverse interest” exception, but this applies only where the
agent intends to act “solely” for the benefit of someone other than
the principal. 14 Indeed, this narrow exception to imputation is
itself subject to an exception (the result being imputation) “when
necessary to protect the rights of a third party” dealing in good
faith. 15 In this sense, the doctrine of imputation similarly
10. E.g., Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.
1982) (holding that the allegedly negligent auditors could invoke imputation as
a defense when corporate management committed fraud on behalf of the
corporation).
11. See Shepard, supra note 8, pt. II.
12. Id. at 293.
13. Id. at 280–81.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (2006).
15. Id. § 5.04(a).
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requires a delicate balancing of the equities. 16 Critically, however,
as Shepard rightly observes, the aims of in pari delicto and
imputation are entirely unrelated—doubly so, in fact. The in pari
delicto defense applies where the plaintiff is an equal wrongdoer,
whereas imputation is not fault-based; the agency analysis
simply does not turn on whether the principal is a “wrongdoer,”
as such. Moreover, imputation was developed to deny a principaldefendant a defense, not to deny a principal-plaintiff a claim. 17
Put differently, imputation was built to deny a shield, not to deny
a sword.
As Shepard’s careful analysis of the case law reveals, courts
have been all over the map in auditor malpractice cases brought
on behalf of corporations at which fraud occurred, some
permitting the in pari delicto defense to be raised more liberally,
while others have been more restrictive—the difference turning
most conspicuously on the scope of the adverse interest exception
to imputation. The inconsistency in the case law, Shepard argues,
has arisen because courts have, by and large, focused on the
wrong question. The ultimate touchstone for the in pari delicto
analysis should be whether the corporation was a “wrongdoer” in
some pertinent respect—an issue to which the agency doctrine of
imputation may be relevant but is not determinative. 18
Shepard’s analysis of the case law and her clarification of the
appropriate standard are substantial contributions in themselves.
She continues, however, building upon this foundation by offering
a pragmatic and reasonable proposal that follows quite logically
from her account of the nature of these disputes. Determining the
appropriate liability exposure for auditors negligently failing to
detect corporate fraud must turn, to some degree, on the
boundaries of the corporation itself—specifically, whose acts
count as “corporate” acts in the relevant sense. To be sure, there
is some recognition of the core ontological problem in the cases
but little consistency in addressing it. On one view, the officerfraudster’s acts and knowledge are straightforwardly the
corporation’s acts and knowledge, rendering the in pari delicto
16.
17.
18.

See Shepard, supra note 8, at 281–83, 286.
Id. at 324–27.
Id. at 316–18, 324–27.
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defense readily available to auditors. 19 On another view, however,
the auditors themselves ought to be treated as “insiders”—agents,
like officers, who are effectively internal to the corporate
enterprise when it comes to ensuring the integrity of financial
statements, and therefore should not benefit from the in pari
delicto defense via imputation. 20
Perceiving that the problem, in essence, amounts to
determining
what
acts—and
more
specifically,
what
wrongdoing—ought to be treated as “corporate” wrongdoing,
Shepard proposes a solution that is both doctrinally consistent
with approaches taken in other corporate disputes, and mindful
of broader policy concerns regarding the scope of auditor liability.
Observing that corporate law has already explored the
relationship between the fiduciary duties of the board—the entity
responsible for management of the corporation 21—and the
detection and prevention of fraud and other illegal conduct, she
proposes that we use that preexisting framework as a means of
conceptualizing “corporate” wrongdoing in auditor malpractice
cases. Specifically, the monitoring and reporting systems that
fiduciary duties already effectively require the board to adopt 22
“may,” she suggests, “provide the best yardstick by which to
measure a corporation’s acts.” 23 Her response to the underlying
ontological problem is elegant and suitably tailored to the context
at issue—whatever the corporation may “be” (in some
metaphysical sense) vis-à-vis its agents, we can coherently judge
whether the corporation itself should be treated as a wrongdoer
by reference to the quality of its institutionalized efforts to
prevent and detect wrongdoing by those who work for it.
While no corporate monitoring system can be perfect,
Shepard’s approach would strongly reinforce preexisting
incentives to devise an effective monitoring and reporting
system—because doing so would help preserve the corporation’s
19. Id. at 321.
20. Id. at 310–13.
21. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
22. E.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
23. Shepard, supra note 8, at 328.
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ability to sue auditors for malpractice. She acknowledges that
there is widespread debate regarding the appropriate level of
liability exposure for “gatekeeper” professionals such as
auditors—and reason to fear that excessive liability might deter
them from offering needed services—but rightly notes that there
are plenty of other levers to pull in seeking to achieve the optimal
level of liability exposure. 24
Shepard’s proposed solution is a compelling one, and there is
reason to believe that such an approach could bring clarity,
consistency, and predictability to an incoherent case law. Her
proposal effectively amounts to a general conceptual framework,
however, leaving to future work the precise means of
implementing it. This is fair enough—particularly given the
considerable terrain covered, and contribution made, in her
doctrinal and policy analyses. Accordingly, the thoughts
expressed in the remainder of this comment should be
interpreted not as implicit criticism but as taking up the
conversation that Shepard initiates toward implementation of a
worthy proposal.
As noted above, Shepard’s proposed approach to measuring
corporate wrongdoing in auditor malpractice cases draws upon
the fiduciary duty-based approach to the board’s monitoring
obligations set forth in landmark Delaware cases including
Caremark 25 and Stone v. Ritter, 26 which require good-faith effort
to implement adequate monitoring and reporting systems. 27 As
she observes, however, “Delaware courts have set a high hurdle
for plaintiffs seeking to recover from individual directors.” 28 As
set forth in Caremark, “only a sustained or systematic failure of
the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability.” 29 Given the policy aims legitimating the in
24.
25.
1996).
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 320–24, 332, 335–37.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Shepard, supra note 8, at 329.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (emphasis added); see also Ritter, 911 A.2d
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pari delicto defense—which Shepard does not dispute—and valid
concerns regarding excessive auditor liability, “evidence of more
than the mere existence of systems may be desirable” to permit
corporations at which fraud went undetected to proceed with
malpractice suits against their auditors. 30 She adds that
measuring fault in the manner proposed “would require a factintensive inquiry,” 31 but does not explore how this inquiry might
work—a nontrivial matter, given that one could readily imagine
an excessively open-ended inquiry leading directly back to
simplistic reliance on imputation and the inconsistency across
jurisdictions that she rightly criticizes.
In building a doctrinal structure on the framework that
Shepard proposes, the considerations that factored into the
Caremark approach would provide a worthy starting point.
Caremark was itself inspired by an approach taken to assessing
corporate wrongdoing in another thorny area noted at the
outset—corporate criminal liability. Then-Chancellor Allen,
writing in 1996, noted “the potential impact of the federal
organizational sentencing guidelines on any business
organization,” concluding that “[a]ny rational person attempting
in good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility
would be bound to take into account this development and the
enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions
that it offers.” 32 The strength of the incentives created by the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 33 coupled with their
prominence in the marketplace, rendered it unthinkable to Allen
that a fiduciary making a good-faith effort to discharge her
obligations could ignore them. Promulgated in 1991, the
Guidelines ultimately became a powerful driver in corporate
compliance program design, further reflecting both market
familiarity and their practical significance. 34
at 369.
30. Shepard, supra note 8, at 329.
31. Id. at 333.
32. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2011).
34. Lynn Sharp Paine & Christopher M. Bruner, Legal Compliance
Programs 1–2 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Pub., note 9-306-014, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

362

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 355 (2012)

The Guidelines’ core standard—whether the company has
“an effective compliance and ethics program” 35—might be taken
as a starting point for developing a standard useful in the in pari
delicto/imputation context, and the factors identified in the
Guidelines could in turn provide the starting point for a multifactor test reducing the indeterminacy of an unavoidably factintensive inquiry. Factors identified in the Guidelines, for
example, include establishing “standards and procedures to
prevent and detect criminal conduct”; a “knowledgeable” board
that exercises “reasonable oversight” regarding the program;
designated
“high-level
personnel”
exercising
“overall
responsibility” for the program, while delegating “day-to-day
operational responsibility” to specific lower-level individuals;
“reasonable efforts” to prevent those who have engaged in illegal
or unethical conduct from having “substantial authority” to act
for the corporation; providing “effective training programs”;
monitoring, auditing, and evaluating the program, including a
reporting system available to employees and agents; incentives
and disciplinary procedures to promote enforcement; and
appropriate responses to criminal conduct once detected. 36
The potential utility of such an approach is hardly
diminished by the fact that Caremark itself substantially
insulates directors from associated liability under corporate law
for failing to implement such a system. The high hurdle that
Caremark set before plaintiffs was driven by fear that excessive
liability might render outside directorships unappealing—
effectively the concern motivating the business judgment rule. 37
While the prospect of substantial auditor liability could raise
similar concerns, Shepard rightly observes that there are plenty
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2011) (emphasis
added).
36. Id. § 8B2.1(b)–(c). For additional background on design and
implementation issues, see Paine & Bruner, supra note 34, at 2–4.
37. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (“[A] demanding test of liability in the
oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate shareholders as a class, as
it is in the board decision context, since it makes board service by qualified
persons more likely . . . .”); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of
Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1157–59 (2006) (discussing director liability under
the Caremark decision).
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of ways to mitigate this risk, including caps, indemnification, and
proportionate liability. 38 Accordingly, the system’s effectiveness
could remain an appropriate benchmark, more meaningfully
illuminating the degree of corporate wrongdoing than would mere
good-faith effort to implement any old system.
To be sure, other standards measured by different factors
might do the job even better. The modest purpose of this
discussion is simply to reinforce what Shepard’s excellent Note
already amply demonstrates—that a practically and conceptually
superior approach to the in pari delicto defense in auditor
malpractice cases is eminently achievable. Shepard supplies the
framework for such an approach, and courts would do well to take
up the challenge.

38. Shepard, supra note 8, at 324, 336–37. Efforts to calibrate auditors’
liability exposure in the securities litigation context provide a menu of options.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) (imposing constraints on private securities
litigation and associated liability, including a proportionate liability regime).

